2025年2月

Fukushima Economics Workshop 2024のお知らせ（2025/2/18）

荒 知宏准教授からのお知らせです。

下記のとおり、近代経済セミナーとの共催で、「Fukushima Economics Workshop 2024」を実施いたします。事前の参加申込みは不要ですので、興味のあるセッションに自由にお越しください。詳しいプログラム内容は以下の通りです（プログラムでは、報告者の敬称を省略させていただいております）。

日時：2025年2月22日（土）12:45−17:30

場所：経済経営学類棟（キャンパスマップの5の建物）6階609合同研究室

12:45−13:00  Opening Remarks

13:00−13:45

荒 知宏（福島大学）

  Trade Elasticity and Gains from Trade under Vertical Oligopoly

(with Arpita Chatterjee, Arghya Ghosh and Hongyong Zhang)

要旨：

What is the effect of trade costs on trade flows and welfare when vertically related sectors are oligopolistic? To address the question, this paper develops a vertical oligopoly model in which one country specializes in producing a final good while another country specializes in producing an intermediate good by taking account of strategic interactions among firms. Using constant-elasticity demand and imposing free entry on vertically related sectors, we find that trade liberalization increases both the number of trading firms (extensive margin) and average trade value per firm (intensive margin) in each sector, thereby raising the trade elasticity relative to that in the perfectly competitive benchmark. This amplified effect arises from co-movement of firms in vertical disintegration, which is more significant, the more oligopolistic the vertically related sectors. The welfare effect of trade liberalization is also greater, the more oligopolistic the vertically related sectors.

13:45−14:30

川窪 悦章（大阪大学）

Spillovers through the Supply Chains: How Large Plant Openings Affect Local Supplier Firms　

(with Takafumi Suzuki) 

要旨：

This study examines whether and how becoming a supplier to newly established manufacturing plants in close proximity affects the subsequent performance of incumbent firms. To address this question, we integrate detailed plant-level production data, records of new openings of large plants, and supply chain information. Our empirical strategy exploits the spatial distribution of new entrants to construct a quasi-experimental setting, comparing firms that start supplying nearby new entrants with those that do not. The event study estimates suggest that there exist positive spillover effects of large plant openings on the performance of nearby supplier firms, compared to the other nearby firms.

14:30−14:45

休憩

14:45−15:30

張 紅詠（経済産業研究所）

Industrial Subsidies along Domestic Value Chains and their Impacts on China’s Exports

(with Wenyin Cheng, David Tao Liang and Bo Meng)

要旨：

China exports more industrial products at lower prices worldwide than any other country. This paper examines whether industrial subsidies can explain China’s export performance and competitiveness in the global market. Using firm-level subsidy data and inter-provincial input-output tables with firm ownerships, we measure direct subsidies and indirect subsidies in upstream industries. Our findings reveal several vital points: (1) Direct subsidies significantly enhance Chinese firms’ export participation (extensive margin) and export volume (intensive margin). The effect on intensive margin is larger than extensive margin. (2) Surprisingly, upstream indirect subsidies—particularly those from 1st tier upstream industries—also contribute significantly to export growth. (3) Both domestic firms and foreign-invested enterprises benefit from direct subsidies, but the effect of upstream subsidies varies by firm ownership. (4) Contrary to prediction, subsidies do not lead to lower export prices. Both direct and indirect subsidies are positively associated with product quality, leading to lower quality-adjusted prices. These export growth and quality upgrading are driven by (i) direct subsidies through increased R&D and imported inputs, and (ii) indirect subsidies through domestic intermediate inputs. These results suggest that government support may promote quality upgrading and enhance the global competitiveness of Chinese exporters 

15:30−16:15

清田 耕造（慶應義塾大学）

Regional Impacts of International Tourism Boycott: A China-Japan Conflict

(with Theresa M. Greaney)

要旨：

We examine the regional impacts of the Sino-Japan dispute over the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands that sparked a Chinese consumer boycott of travel to Japan from August, 2012. We find that the boycott caused large and regionally heterogenous effects in Japan. The boycott’s negative impacts are larger for Japanese prefectures with higher pre-boycott dependency on visitors, especially tourists, from China. However, the aggregate effects of the boycott become insignificant when the much larger flows of domestic travelers are included in the analysis. Our results demonstrate the importance of diversification across traveler types and countries of origin in the provision of travel services.

16:15−16:30

休憩

16:30−17:15

柳瀬 明彦（名古屋大学）

International transfers of green technology and carbon mitigation outcome 

(with Haitao Cheng)

要旨：

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement aims to foster international cooperation between developed and developing countries in curbing global carbon emissions. Central to this provision is the facilitation of international transfers of green technology and carbon mitigation outcomes. Through this mechanism, developed countries transfer their green technology to developing countries to help them mitigate emissions. In return, developing countries transfer emission permits equivalent to the mitigated outcomes to developed countries to alleviate their abatement burden. This study employs an international oligopoly model to explore the implications of green technology transfer (GTT) and international transfer of mitigated outcomes (ITMO) on welfare, emission permit issuance and global emissions. We find that when emission permits are exogenously given, these transfers always improve global welfare. When emission permits are endogenously determined, transfers always decrease global emissions and enhance global welfare in the non- cooperative setting. However, in the cooperative setting, the implementation of transfers does not affect global emissions or welfare. Moreover, in the absence of transfers, global emissions are lower and global welfare is higher at the cooperative equilibrium than at the non-cooperative one. Nevertheless, when transfers are introduced, cooperative global emissions can be lower or higher than their non-cooperative counterparts; however, cooperative global welfare is consistently higher.

17:15−17:30  Concluding Remarks

※本ワークショップはJSPS科研費23K01395、24K00255の助成を受けています。